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Abstract 
Pipelines are commonly considered a safe alternative for the transportation of hazardous materials. 
However, in case of failure, pipelines still pose major risks to the environment and to the population 
potentially exposed. The aim of the present work is to provide occurrence probabilities of the 
intermediate and final events following the accidental release of hazardous materials from pipelines. 
A collection of incidents and accidents occurred worldwide in connection with the use of onshore 
long-distance pipeline networks, has been gathered to make up a specific database for the analysis 
of incidents in pipelines. A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data has allowed to develop 
detailed event trees for the different classes of hazardous materials, and to calculate the probability 
of occurrence of the final outcomes. The investigation has also aimed at identifying, for each type 
of release, the relationship between the final events and the causes of the pipeline failure. The 
results obtained represent a useful and needed starting point in Quantitative Risk Analysis of 
hazardous materials transportation via pipelines. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Pipeline transportation is commonly regarded as a safer alternative compared to other transportation 
modes, such as road and rail, based on the low accident frequency and the generally limited number 
of fatalities historically registered (Papadakis, 1999). Nonetheless, due to the continually increasing 
extension of their network, pipelines often cross highly populated and industrialized areas, so that in 
case of a loss of containment involving a hazardous substance, significant damages can affect a 
large number of people. At the same time, given the close interaction between the pipeline and 
human activities, the frequency of occurrence of failures can become significant. When crossing 
rural areas, despite the low number of people possibly involved, environmental impact and 
pollution can result. As a matter of fact, a number of recent accidents, such as the one occurred in 
Ghislenghien, Belgium, on July 30, 2004, where the rupture of a high pressure natural gas pipeline 
and the subsequent large fire caused 23 casualties and around 150 hospitalized (ARIA, 2009), or the 
one occurred in Marshall, Michigan (NTSB, 2012), with an important pollution on a wetland and 
two rivers, confirm this concern. 
 
Consequently, an increasing attention has been devoted in recent years to the quantification of the 
risk associated with this transportation mode based on the well-known techniques of Quantitative 
Risk Analysis (QRA) (Jo and Ahn, 2005; Dziubinski et al., 2006; Jo and Crowl, 2008; Casal, 2008; 
Han and Weng, 2010). This methodology consists in a stepwise procedure where the following 
main phases are carried out: identification of the accident scenarios, calculation of their 
consequences in terms of damaged areas and people involved, estimation of their frequency of 
occurrence and, finally, quantification of the overall risk (CCPS, 2000; CCPS, 2008). Each of these 
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steps entails specific difficulties and uncertainties, but the step usually most affected by a higher 
level of uncertainty is the frequency estimation. The frequency of occurrence of the identified 
events can be estimated either by a statistical analysis of historical data, which, whenever 
applicable, is the most reliable methodology, or by means of some theoretical models, such as Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). Unfortunately, historical data are often 
lacking, and therefore the application of the latter techniques becomes necessary, which in turn 
require specialized and experienced personnel to be properly carried out. Even in this case, a rather 
high level of uncertainty remains when the system under investigation is not simple enough and 
clearly defined, and when not all the needed input data are known. This is the case of pipeline 
transportation, where a high variability of the characteristics of the territories crossed by the line 
and a wide range of unpredictable possible events is present (Dziubinski et al., 2006). 
 
Both approaches have been adopted in the literature, mainly devoted at identifying the frequency of 
occurrence of a release (Henselwood and Phillips, 2006; Han and Weng, 2010) rather than at 
calculating the probability of the different possible events following a release (Rew et al., 2000; 
Moosemiller, 2011). Overall values of the accidents and release frequencies are also available in the 
generic literature (De Haag and Ale, 1999; Lees, 2005; EGIG, 2008; PHMSA, 2016). 
 
 
Based on the above considerations, and with the aim of improving the knowledge of the data 
required to carry out a QRA, in this paper a statistical analysis of historical data on accidents 
involving pipelines occurred all over the world has been carried out. No consideration has been 
given here to the magnitude of the consequences of the releases. A preliminary analysis of data 
collected from sources of specialized information has already been presented (Ramírez-Camacho et 
al., 2016), with particular emphasis on issues related to land-use planning. In the present paper the 
gathered historical data has been properly processed and a more detailed analysis of the historical 
data has been carried out to provide a useful basis for estimating the conditional probabilities of the 
different events that can occur following the accidental release of hazardous materials from 
pipelines. In fact, the release of a flammable and/or toxic material may evolve in different ways, 
depending on a number of factors, such as the physicochemical properties of the transported 
material, the type of release (puncture, leak, catastrophic) and its duration, the mass released, the 
outside environmental conditions, the time and circumstances of the ignition and many others. 
Consequently, dedicated event trees have been developed for the different substance categories 
identified, and the statistical analysis of the historical records has made it possible to estimate the 
conditional probabilities for each specific release sequence. These probabilities represent 
fundamental parameters to be used in QRA, when the risk generated by the presence of a pipeline 
transporting hazardous materials on the potentially exposed population has to be assessed. 
 
 
2. Data gathering and filtering 
 
An historical data collection has been carried out in order to gather as much information as possible 
about the events that take place after a loss of containment from onshore pipelines transporting 
hazardous materials. The survey has been performed by consulting accident databases and other 
open sources of information such as accident reports and technical reports covering pipeline 
incidents. The main consulted sources were: 
 
 
• The Analysis, Research and Information on Accidents database (ARIA, 2014) 
• The Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing of Germany (BAM, 2009) 
• The Major Hazard Incident Data Service database (MHIDAS, 2007) 
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• The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB, 2014) 
• The U.K. Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2000, 2002) 
• The U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (DOT-PHMSA, 2014). 
• The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 2014). 
• The Oil Companies European Organization for Environment, Health and Safety 
(CONCAWE, 2013). 
 
The MHIDAS database (November 2007 version, containing 14,168 records), which has been used 
as the main source of information, is managed by the UK Health and Safety Executive; it includes 
incidents that have occurred during the transport, processing or storage of hazardous materials, 
which resulted in or had the potential to cause an off-site impact. This database stores each incident 
in individual fields (i.e., date, location, incident type, origin, cause, abstract, deaths, injuries, among 
others); these same fields were used in this study. Moreover, for each incident more information 
was drawn up and placed in new additional fields: part of system involved, system type, pipeline 
diameter, operating pressure, environmental damages. 
 
 
In order to identify the records of interest, a first filtering operation was conducted on the MHIDAS 
database, based on the fields "general origin" and "specific origin". Among the general origins, the 
transport activity was selected. Concerning “specific origin”, the incidents in onshore pipelines 
were filtered. Later on, the ‘‘Abstract” field of the incidents -one by one- was analysed in order to 
double-check that accidents were correctly selected. Accidents occurring in offshore pipelines, 
those caused by sabotage or from short-distance pipelines (i.e. transfer pipelines, gas service lines 
or LNG pipelines) were not considered in this study. A logical sequence of the steps adopted in the 
selection procedure is reported in Fig. 1. 
 
 
After applying this extraction process, a collection of 639 accidents was considered. Subsequently, 
a parallel research by consulting freely accessible information on official sources was conducted. 
The goal was to complement the missing information in the selected records of MHIDAS. 
Simultaneously, the space-time search intervals up to 2014 were extended. As a result, a total of 
542 additional accidents was included. Finally, a matching procedure between both sets of data was 
performed, with the aim of finding matching records. The ‘‘Date of incident” and ‘‘Location” fields 
were used as initial references for this purpose. Finally, after this procedure, a collection of 1063 
accidents was obtained (for further details see Ramírez-Camacho et al., 2016). 
 
 
3. Information processing 
 
The types of events occurring after the loss of containment of a hazardous material depend on a 
range of factors, either linked with the material itself (physical properties, hazardous properties, 
etc.) and/or with the internal and external pipeline conditions: physical state, pressure and 
temperature inside the pipeline, release rate and amount of material released, weather conditions 
(e.g., wind velocity, atmospheric stability class), surrounding territory characteristics (flat/hilly, 
rural/urban), population distribution, etc. All these parameters can influence the evolution of the 
accident following the release, either by generating, promoting or hampering the occurrence of the 
possible intermediate and final events. Based on these considerations, the collected information has 
been analysed in order to estimate the probability of occurrence of each of the events identified. 
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3.1. Hazardous materials involved 
 
The properties of the substances involved have a marked influence on the consequences of the 
release. If the released fluid is a gas and there is immediate ignition, a jet fire will occur; if there is 
no immediate ignition, a flash fire or a cloud explosion is still possible (delayed ignition), 
depending on the environmental conditions and if the explosive air/gas mixture is between its 
flammable limits. Conversely, a liquid spill will drop on the ground, forming a pool, which can be 
ignited, giving rise to a pool fire, or can evaporate generating a cloud subject to the same evolution 
as for a gaseous release. A pressure-liquefied gas can behave in either or both ways depending on 
its physical properties and transport conditions. 
 
 
A number of different substances were identified; however, they were grouped into a few categories 
for estimating the corresponding probabilities. 
 
 
Gases are usually transported at relatively high pressure and can represent a single class of 
substances. Concerning liquids, since in the vast majority of the cases the liquids involved were 
flammable, they have been grouped into two distinct classes, based on their flash point (Tf). Finally, 
pressure liquefied gases represent another specific group of materials, so that the following four 
groups of substances were finally identified: 
 
 
• Compressed gases, 
• Pressure liquefied gases, 
• Volatile liquids (with Tf ≤21 ̊ C), 
• Liquids with low volatility (with Tf >21 ̊ C). 
 
According to the materials involved, and based on the above classification, the distribution of 
historical accidents reported in Table 1 was obtained. It is important to mention that 14 events 
involved more than one material, however, only the first material of the events has been considered 
here. 
 
 
 
It can be seen that the following distribution among the defined classes is obtained: compressed gas 
27.4% (291 entries); pressure-liquefied gases 4.7 % (50 entries), volatile liquids 57.2% (608 
entries); low volatility liquids 10.73% (114 entries). More in details, most of the accidents included 
in the group of compressed gases involved natural gas (more than 99% of the entries), while LPG 
represented more than 68% of the cases with pressure-liquefied gases; in the case of volatile liquids, 
crude oil (47.2%), and gasoline (about 50%) were the main items, while jet fuel (42.1%), diesel 
(27.2%) and kerosene (12.3%), summed up to 80% of the low volatile liquid cases. 
 
 
3.2. Types of release 
 
The magnitude of the consequences of an accident also depends on the amount of material released, 
which in turn depends on the extension of the pipeline damage, the detection time, the time required 
to stop the flow through the pipe (via pumps and/or gate valves), etc. Similar to the procedure 
adopted for the type of material described above, three different release modalities were identified 
and defined as follows: 
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• Release from a hole: it refers to a hole of small size (a fraction of the pipe diameter), for which 
the detection time ranges between 20 s and 24 h (Dziubiński et al., 2006). A long duration 
release from a hole is often referred also as a "leak"; a short duration release as a "spill". 
• Full bore rupture: when the extension of the damaged area of the pipe is equal to, or larger than, 
its diameter. 
• Catastrophic rupture: a sudden rupture that involves a significant section of the pipeline. When 
the substances involved are compressed gases or liquefied gases, this might generate a physical 
explosion. 
 
3.3. Incident outcomes 
 
Following an accidental loss of containment, a number of intermediate and final events, either 
alternative or coexisting, may happen, whose probability of occurrence depend on the combination 
of many factors, as explained before (materials properties, environmental conditions, etc.). 
 
A general description will follow here, to qualitatively introduce and to account for the structure of 
the event trees set up for the different materials classes. The corresponding quantitative values 
obtained from the database analysis will be discussed in Section 4. 
 
 
3.3.1. Fires 
 
The ignition of a flammable substance can give rise to different types of fire, depending on the fuel 
properties and on the environmental conditions at the time of the ignition. A jet fire results from the 
immediate ignition of a turbulent jet of a flammable gas, vapour or liquid, which is usually 
associated with pressure releases. When the immediate ignition involves a large mass of flammable 
vapours (often derived from the catastrophic rupture of a large vessel or pipe), a fireball is 
generated; this is typical of releases involving directly a gas or a pressure liquefied gas with a large 
flash fraction. Alternatively, if a relatively large mass of flammable material first disperses and 
mixes with ambient air, and subsequently the generated fuel-air mixture is ignited, a very fast 
combustion of the cloud occurs (flash fire). This can be characteristic of many accidental scenarios 
such as a gas release, as well as after the evaporation (either immediate or continuous) of a liquid. 
 
 
The ignition of the vapours generated by a liquid pool will cause a pool fire. However, different 
types of pool fires can follow a given initial release: the local (i.e., close to the release site) ignition 
of the pool, either immediate or delayed, will generate a pool fire in the area of the spill; if the 
liquid moves away from the location of the release, and finally finds an ignition source, a pool fire 
away from the accident location will occur (this event will be hereafter addressed as a “fire on 
migrating liquid surface”). When the evaporation from the pool is capable of generating a 
flammable cloud “connected” with the pool itself, a delayed ignition of the cloud can also trigger 
the fire on the pool, so that more than one single dangerous event is produced. Pool fires are typical 
both of high and low volatility liquids, as well as of pressure liquefied gases; however, sometimes 
the delayed ignition is not considered for liquids with low volatility because it is believed that 
vapour clouds at concentrations within the flammability limits are not generated (Ronza et al., 
2007). 
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In addition to that, in the case of a turbulent jet release, a delayed ignition can give rise to multiple 
outcomes: a local ignition will directly and simultaneously generate the combustion of the cloud 
(flash fire or vapour cloud explosion, depending on the environmental conditions) and the jet fire, 
while a remote ignition will first start the cloud combustion and subsequently cause the jet fire. 
 
 
3.3.2. Explosions 
 
The failure of a high-pressure pipeline, such as those containing high-pressure gases or pressure-
liquefied gases, can theoretically give rise to a blast wave, as in the case of storage/process vessels. 
Nonetheless, as can be seen in the next section, no specific reference was found in the accident 
reports used in the present investigation. It can be a matter of discussion whether this is because of a 
lack of information or because they actually never happened; however, based on this experimental 
evidence, the physical explosion has not been considered here in setting up the event trees. 
 
 
Alternatively, when a large mass of flammable material is released and dispersed in the 
environment, in case of delayed ignition, besides a flash fire, a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) can 
occur. This occurs when the combustion rate markedly increases and the flame front is strongly 
accelerated, which usually happens in the presence of turbulence, and some level of confinement. 
 
 
3.3.3. Vapour clouds and/or liquids dispersion 
 
Besides the above considerations connected with the flammability characteristics of the released 
substance, other possible dangerous events have to be taken into account, depending on the 
substance properties. Following the loss of containment, a vapour cloud and/or a liquid pool will 
disperse into the environment. If the vapour is toxic, a very dangerous toxic cloud can affect the 
population in the surroundings of the accident site, and this often represents a serious possible 
consequence of a hazardous substance loss of containment; furthermore, even if the material is not 
toxic, the risk of asphyxiation at high concentrations is present, especially in partially confined or 
even enclosed areas (Bubbico et al., 2014). Similar considerations apply to a liquid pollutant, which 
can disperse generating severe consequences to the environment and/or the population. 
 
 
Since flammable materials have been involved in all the cases considered in the present analysis, 
and no, or very little, information was provided about the other possible effects, the above 
damaging events have not been included in the devised event trees. As a result, in the absence of 
combustion, the terms “no consequences” and “no fire/explosion”, adopted in the following event 
trees, have here the same meaning. Nonetheless, it must be observed that in the case of toxic or 
polluting substances, these final outcomes should be properly considered, otherwise severe 
consequences might be neglected and the overall risk would be finally underestimated. 
 
 
3.4. Generic and specific failure causes 
 
The causes originating the analysed accidents were assigned to a limited number of generic classes, 
and for each of them additional subclasses, corresponding to the specific cause of failure, were 
identified (see Table 2). This classification has already been discussed with reference to land-use 
planning (Ramírez-Camacho et al., 2016). 
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Third party activity represents any external mechanical interference caused by third party operators 
unaware of the presence of the pipeline. In the particular case of buried pipelines, specific causes 
are related to excavators, construction companies or other equipment used in excavation activities 
or farmlands, etc. Pipelines crossing other utility service lines (e.g., water/gas mains, phone lines, 
etc.) have an increased potential for third party incidents. Generally, mechanical interference leads 
to a puncture, a crack or to a gouge that reduces the wall thickness of the pipe; depending on these 
factors, the pipe failure can be immediate or may occur sometime later by fatigue or corrosion. On 
the contrary, when the pipeline company causes the damage to the pipe during operations of 
maintenance, repair/replace, start-up, etc., the failure origin is classified as operational/human 
errors. 
 
It is important to stress that only the initial cause of the pipe failure has been kept here into account. 
 
 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
An accurate analysis of the accident reports was carried out, and dedicated event trees were 
developed for each category of substances identified in Table 1. These instruments of quantitative 
analysis, reported in Figs. 2-5, allowed obtaining frequencies of occurrence of the different types of 
final events, following the initial release (“loss of containment”), either for each class of substances 
and for each type of release. 
 
 
In the event trees of Figs. 2-5, along with the conditional probabilities, the absolute number of the 
accidents corresponding to each branch has also been included. This has been done to provide 
thorough information and to highlight the statistical significance of the calculations. As a final 
remark it must be stressed that all the following probability values might be somewhat 
overestimated, since it is expected that an unknown number of accidental releases from pipelines 
characterized by minor or no damages have not been officially reported. 
 
 
4.1. Compressed gases 
 
As already mentioned, among the 291 scenarios including compressed gases, 2 cases involved 
hydrogen and 289 cases (i.e., almost the totality of accidents) natural gas (see Table 1), so that we 
could actually say that the considerations below essentially apply to natural gas. 
 
 
From the event tree set up for this class of accidents (Fig. 2), it can be seen that the most frequent 
types of release are the "full bore rupture" and the “release from hole”, with 40.5% and 36.4% 
probability (118 and 106 entries), respectively. The "catastrophic rupture" (49 cases), corresponds 
to 16.8%, while only for 18 accidents (6.2%) it was not possible to specify the type of release. The 
immediate ignition is not very likely for the two most common release types, showing a probability 
of 0.24 for the full bore rupture and only 0.06 for the release from a hole. Moosemiller (2011) 
provides an average value of 0.15 for the immediate ignition probability, independent of the type of 
flammable released and the magnitude and duration of the release (however, the study does not cite 
the origin of this value). The averaged value of the immediate ignition probability obtained from the 
present data, with the weights being the fraction of cases of small and full bore ruptures releases, is 
found to be 0.157, thus perfectly matching the value found in the literature. 
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For releases from holes, when the cloud dispersion is almost certain (92 cases out of 98 
characterized by the “no immediate ignition” option), a higher delayed ignition probability is 
observed with respect to the full bore rupture (60.9% and 46.4%, respectively); furthermore, the 
probability of flame front acceleration is higher for a release from a hole rather than from a full bore 
rupture, with 89.3% and 64.1%, respectively. It is apparent that, conversely to the case of the 
immediate ignition probability, the obtained probabilities for delayed ignition and explosion found 
based on the reported data are much higher (more than double) than those cited by Moosemiller 
(2011), i.e., 0.3 and 0.2, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3 reports the probabilities of occurrence of the possible final events occurring after the release 
of a compressed gas (VCE, flash fire, etc.): in the first four columns the probabilities associated 
with each type of release are reported (release from hole, full bore rupture, etc.), while in the last 
column the overall probabilities, for all compressed gas releases independently of the type, are 
shown. It must be observed that since some of the final accidents can happen simultaneously, the 
probabilities of each column can amount to more than 1. 
 
 
The combination of all conditional probabilities reported above provides a final probability of a 
vapour cloud explosion (with or without a simultaneous jet fire) of 0.51 in the case of release from a 
hole, and 0.225 for a full bore rupture (see Table 3). Given the larger size of the release section for a 
full bore rupture with respect to smaller holes, this result looks rather strange and in contrast with 
the suggestion by Cox et al. (1990), who state that the ignition probability increases with the release 
flow rate. A possible explanation of the present result might be the longer detection times, usually 
required in case of smaller releases, compared with more serious accidents, which in turn can 
finally give rise to a larger amount of flammable gas in the dispersed cloud. Since the amount of 
flammable material in the cloud is recognized as one of the main conditions required for the 
occurrence of a cloud explosion, this can explain the results obtained. Differently, in the case of a 
catastrophic rupture, the immediate ignition, with subsequent fireball, is quite likely (0.61), while in 
the case of no immediate ignition a safe dispersion can be expected (0.39 probability). 
 
 
If the overall probabilities are taken into considerations (fifth column in Table 3), some other 
interesting conclusions can be drawn. In more than one third of all the cases (specifically 38%) 
there were no dangerous consequences. This is a quite low value if compared to previous analyses 
(Wang and Duncan, 2014 and EGIG, 2015), where an overall ignition probability between 2% and 
18% was obtained, depending on a number of factors like pipeline diameter, release magnitude, etc. 
 
 
Among all the dangerous events, the jet fire is the most likely (41% of occurrence, compared to 
31.4% occurrence of a VCE or a 7.4% occurrence of a flash fire), deriving either from an 
immediate ignition of the release, or generated by another preceding dangerous event like a cloud 
fire or a VCE. The relatively high probability of a VCE is in contrast with previous statements (Jo 
and Ahn, 2005), whereas similar considerations have been reported for jet fires. 
 
 
If the catastrophic rupture of the pipeline is taken into consideration, which occurs in about 17% of 
the cases, another interesting result is found. While an immediate ignition with subsequent fireball 
and jet fire is the most likely evolution following the release, with more than 60% probability, in the 
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remaining 19 cases, no delayed ignition has been observed, a safe dispersion of the cloud being 
registered in all cases. In other words, in case of a catastrophic rupture, if an immediate fireball is 
not generated, it seems that a safe dispersion of the released gas can unexpectedly be trusted. 
According to the above figures, a fireball is not very common (0.11 probability), being associated 
only with the immediate ignition of a catastrophic release. 
 
 
 
Finally, it can be observed from Fig. 2 that the conditional probabilities of the events along the 
branches corresponding to the unknown release type, are very close to those characterizing the 
release from a hole; this consideration, along with the fact that the size of the release have not been 
explicitly mentioned in the accident reports, would suggest that these cases might be associated 
with the “release from a hole” class. Similarly to that class, even in these cases, the probability of 
VCE is very high (10 cases out of 13 for which the final consequences are known). 
 
 
As far as the exclusive causes of the release are concerned, it can be seen from Table 4 that in more 
than one third of the examined cases, it was not possible to identify the immediate cause of the loss 
of containment, independently of its severity. In the case of release from full bore rupture and from 
a hole, nearly one third of the incidents had as a generic cause third party activity (30.5% and 
32.1%, respectively), with excavation machinery covering the great majority of the cases (72.2% 
for full bore ruptures and 85.3% for releases from holes), thus representing in absolute the main 
cause of release (more than 0.22 and 0.27 absolute probability, respectively). This result is in line 
with previous literature reports (Hansler et al., 2011; EGIG, 2015); mainly based on data from 
EGIG and BG Transco, Jo and Ahn (2005) claimed external interference as the main cause of 
release for more than 50% of the cases. 
 
 
The remaining 1/3 of the accidents investigated here were originated by causes more or less equally 
distributed among the other generic classes, partly in contrast with Jo and Ahn where a larger 
influence of mechanical failures and corrosion was found. Similarly, Wang and Duncan (2014) 
identified construction and material defects as the main cause of failure for small releases 
(leakages); while external forces and construction/material defects have almost the same probability 
for all other failure types. Even though no specific distinction has been made in the latter work 
among the outside forces (i.e., whether natural or anthropogenic) if the causes associated with 
human activity are taken preferentially into account, one of the possible reasons of the partial 
discrepancy between the present results and those reported by the previous authors may be found in 
the comment already highlighted by Wang and Duncan (2014), i.e., “transmission pipelines in 
Europe transverse a much more urbanized and developed terrain than is found in the United States”; 
for the sake of truth this statement was originally referred to the difference in failures rates between 
Europe and US, but it is believed that it can be equally applied to the root causes of pipeline loss of 
containment. 
 
 
A catastrophic rupture caused by third party activities (16.3%) is less common compared to 
corrosion (28.57%), particularly by external corrosion (57.14% of the whole corrosion types) and 
stress corrosion cracking (35.7%); mechanical failure also plays a significant role (14.29%) 
comparable to that of third party activities, and in most of the cases is associated with the 
generation of internal overpressure (57% of the mechanical failures). 
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Finally, it has to be highlighted that operational human errors, which are often and sometimes 
harshly accused of being responsible of the registered accidents, do not exceed 10% of the analysed 
records of small hole releases, with most of the accidents occurring during repair/replacement or 
maintenance operations. Conversely, a catastrophic rupture seems to be rarely caused by 
operational human errors (2 cases out of 49). 
 
 
4.2. Pressure liquefied gases 
 
According to Fig. 3, in almost 90% of the cases, the release of a pressure-liquefied gas (PLG) 
occurs from a hole or from a full bore rupture (53.1 and 34.7 %, respectively). A catastrophic 
rupture has been recorded only in two cases. 
 
 
As for compressed gases, the immediate ignition of PLG continuous releases is not very likely, 
especially for releases from a hole, and the average value for hole releases and full bore ruptures 
(0.17) matches the literature average value (0.15) rather well. If the flammable cloud is dispersed, 
the probability of ignition is equal to or higher than that of no ignition, depending on the release 
size, and, once ignited, a vapour cloud explosion is always more likely than a simple flash fire: 0.6 
vs. 0.4, and 0.78 vs. 0.22, for hole and full bore ruptures, respectively. For the sake of accuracy, it 
must be observed that the absolute number of events on which the final probability estimation is 
based is rather low, so that the conclusions should be taken with care. This is especially true for the 
catastrophic ruptures and for the remaining unknown release conditions, where only 4 reliable 
historical accident reports have been found. With these cautions in mind, as also found for 
compressed gases, much higher probabilities of delayed ignition and explosion were found here 
with respect to the literature (Moosemiller, 2011). 
 
 
Table 5 shows the probabilities of the final accidental events. It can be seen that an average 
probability of 50% of a safe conclusion of the accidental loss of containment is calculated. 
However, it is worth pointing out that in this case “no ignition” does not necessarily mean “no 
consequences”, since some of the substances included in this class can have also toxic properties 
(e.g., ammonia), and therefore in these cases “no ignition” stands for “toxic cloud dispersion”, 
which is usually characterized by even larger impact areas than fires and explosions. This was not 
the case with compressed gases, in which only natural gas and hydrogen were involved. 
 
 
By considering all the possible accident evolutions among the dangerous final events, jet fire is by 
far the most probable for full bore ruptures (0.7), followed by VCE (around 0.4), while in the case 
of releases from holes, they are equally likely (0.27), but with a much lower probability with respect 
to larger leakages. s observed in the previous section, a more or less complete vaporization of the 
released liquid can occur for pressure liquefied gases; consequently, the local ignition of the release 
(either immediate or delayed) can give rise to both a jet fire and a pool fire, depending on the type 
of fluid and its transport conditions. 
 
 
The number of historical cases for catastrophic and unknown releases is quite low to derive 
statistically meaningful conclusions, and therefore they will be ignored here. 
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Overall, it can be concluded that in the case of pressure liquefied gas releases, there is a 50% 
probability of concluding the accident without dangerous events (neglecting possible toxic 
dispersion, as already highlighted before) or with local damages (jet and pool fires); in addition, 
there is also a 30% probability of generating a higher impact VCE. 
 
 
 
Even though based on a limited number of reported accidents, some general trend related to the 
exclusive causes of release, will be highlighted here (Table 6). With reference to the loss of 
containment from holes, it was found that the most common cause is associated with third party 
activity (approximately 23% of the total), particularly during excavation (2/3 of this generic cause), 
but a significant role is also played by mechanical failures and corrosion (around 15% each). As 
already found for compressed gases, the operational human error is responsible for a limited 
number of the recorded accidents. Excavation is again the most frequent cause of releases from full 
bore ruptures, being responsible of 6 out of 17 (35%) cases, with the remaining accidents more or 
less equally distributed among the other categories of causes: mechanical failures, natural hazards 
and operational human errors. 
 
 
 
4.3. Volatile liquids 
 
Volatile liquids represent the class of substances characterized by the largest number of reported 
accidents (608 cases) and the corresponding event tree is shown in Fig. 4. It can be seen that the 
branch relative to catastrophic release is not present. Also, given the very low number of records 
with uncertain information (only 7 out of 608), two release conditions practically cover the whole 
range of considered events: releases from a hole (with a probability higher than 0.75) and full bore 
ruptures (0.235). Similar to the previous classes of materials, the immediate ignition of the release 
is quite unlikely, with probabilities always well below 10%: namely, 0.4% for releases from holes, 
and 7.2% for full bore rupture. The average immediate ignition probability is now 0.02, much lower 
than for the previous classes and also with respect to the average value of 0.15 sometimes reported 
in the literature (Moosemiller, 2011). This suggests that this latter value should be better considered 
as referred to gases and flashing liquids rather than to liquid fuels. Alternatively, the value of 0.065 
provided by the BEVI manual (RIVM, 2009), referred to Category 1 substances (i.e., Tf<21°), is 
much closer to the probability derived here for full bore rupture (0.072). 
 
 
A delayed ignition is also unlikely for both cases (hole and full bore rupture), with a “no 
fire/explosion” probability of around 0.9 for both rupture types. Overall, a “no outcome” conclusion 
of the accident was observed in 88% of all the cases analysed (see Table 7). Despite the low 
probability of occurrence, a delayed ignition can still give rise to serious accidents, and in 30 of 57 
cases where ignition actually occurred a VCE was registered (Fig. 4), corresponding to an overall 
probability of 5%. As found with compressed gases, the probability of a VCE is higher for releases 
from holes (0.062) than for full bore rupture (0.014), and the same considerations about the 
detection time can be done here. As can be seen in Table 7, the overall probabilities of VCEs and 
“simple” flash fires are quite similar to each other (0.05 and 0.046, respectively); this can be 
explained by the lower amounts of vapours generated, compared with gases and pressure liquefied 
gases, which is one of the pre-requisites for the generation of a vapour cloud explosion. 
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Despite the high volatility of the substance, volatile liquid releases are always characterized by the 
presence of the pool and by much smaller amounts of vapours immediately generated. As a 
consequence, the frequent occurrence of liquid fires can be expected. Table 7 shows that the pool 
fire is the most common accidental event, following an ignition. Furthermore, as already 
highlighted in section 2, depending on the release conditions and the characteristics of the accident 
area, the liquid pool can move away from the release site before ignition and subsequently find a 
source of ignition giving rise to a fire on a migrating liquid pool; in particular, in Table 7 these two 
conditions have been detailed and it can be seen that the migrating liquid fire is the most common 
outcome (0.039 probability versus 0.019 for a local pool fire). It is also interesting to observe that a 
migrating liquid pool fire is always accompanied by another dangerous event (VCE or flash fire), 
confirming the generation by a delayed (or distant) source of ignition. If the two release conditions 
are compared, it can be seen that in the case of the full bore rupture, all the dangerous outcomes 
have a higher probability of occurrence, in accordance with the large amount of material released. 
Finally, due to the small amount of vapours immediately released, the jet fire is now overall the 
least frequent accident. 
 
 
 
For this class of hazardous materials, different trends can be observed with regard to the exclusive 
causes of release, depending on its size (Table 8). Concerning releases from holes, third party 
activities are still the prevailing causation events, especially during excavation works, with slightly 
more than 30% of all cases. The second most frequent cause is corrosion (nearly 20%), mainly 
generated by external agents (more than 50% of the generic cause). Mechanical failures are most 
often associated with materials defects and/or weld failures (57% of the generic cause), while the 
remaining causes represent less than 10% each. Differently, in the case of the 143 full-bore ruptures 
analysed, a rather more uniform distribution of the causes was revealed. Neglecting about 1/3 of the 
cases where no information was available for the identification of the initiating event, the most 
common causes were mechanical failures (20.28%), and third party activities (16.08%), but also 
corrosion and natural hazards caused a significant number of accidents (12.6 and 10.5%, 
respectively). Again, operational human errors proved to be less frequent than might be expected, 
with less than 6% for both release modalities, and most often during repairs/maintenance 
operations. 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Liquids with low volatility 
 
Given the physical properties of the substances belonging to this class of materials, a significant 
amount of vapours capable of generating a dangerous event like a cloud fire or an explosion, 
following an ignition, is not expected even in connection with a long-lasting spill. As a matter of 
fact, no cases of vapour cloud explosion or flash fire are reported in the examined databases (Fig. 
5). Conversely, a number of fires associated with the ignition of the pool generated by the release, 
either in the proximity of the leakage or in a different location due to migration of the liquid pool, 
are reported. Actually, disregarding the consequences, possibly associated with these fires in terms 
of people injured or structures damaged, their probability of occurrence is very low: on a total of 
114 historical accidents investigated, the final event “no fire” was found to have an overall 
probability of nearly 0.94 (Table 9). 
 
However, with reference to this latter scenario, it must be observed that, as already specified above, 
the term “no ignition” or “no fire” does not necessarily mean “no consequences”: they mean that no 
Page 13 of 24
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
combustion of the flammable vapours was recorded, either because no ignition source was present 
during the accident, or because no vapour cloud was generated, or, finally, because the vapour 
cloud did not reach the flammable limit of the substance. Yet, depending on the properties of the 
particular chemical involved, other consequences are possible, like the dispersion of toxic vapours 
or some other kind of environmental pollution: in 84% of the analysed cases environmental 
pollution was actually reported, but these are outside the scope of the present paper and have not 
been further investigated here. 
 
 
As with volatile liquids, no cases of catastrophic rupture have been reported for liquids with low 
volatility, and the release was found to occur from holes in the 86.8% of the cases (Fig. 5), and from 
full bore ruptures with a probability of only 0.132. The jet fire has a probability of occurrence of 
less than 1% overall (occurred in one out of 114 accidents), while that of a pool fire is higher than 
5% (Table 9); compared to volatile liquids, a local pool fire is now more frequent than a migrating 
liquid, being associated mainly with the immediate ignition of the release (4 out of 6 pool fires 
registered). The immediate ignition probability of such substances (0.044) is lower than 0.15 
(Moosemiller, 2011), but larger than reported in the BEVI manual (0.01 for Category 2 substances, 
see RIVM, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
For this class of substances, similar results about the causes of release as those found for volatile 
liquids have been observed (Table 10). Since the total number of full bore rupture was quite low, 
only generic indications can be drawn: most of the releases were caused by mechanical failures, 
mainly associated with internal overpressure and weld or other construction defects. In the case of 
release from holes (99 cases), more meaningful figures can be derived; third party activity is the 
main group of generic causes (33%), with damages during excavation works representing the most 
frequent specific cause (88% of that class); mechanical failure is the second class in terms of 
frequency (more than 24% of the total accidents) with weld failures and materials defects being the 
most common specific contribution (42% and 29% respectively). Corrosion also plays a significant 
role, with 17% of the total release rupture causes, mainly due to external origin. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Even if no consideration has been given in the present paper to the magnitude of the possible 
consequences of the release of dangerous materials from pipelines, the results here presented are 
deemed of great interest for quantifying the risk associated with the use of such a transportation 
mode. In fact, one of the major uncertainties in Quantitative Risk Analysis is the estimation of the 
frequency of occurrence of the different outcomes following an initial dangerous event. In this 
paper, the conditional probabilities of the branches of the post-accident event trees associated with a 
range of hazardous substances have been calculated from historical records. 
 
 
It has been quantitatively confirmed the intuitive hypothesis of the importance of the substance 
volatility: the overall probability of a safe conclusion of an accidental release, continuously and 
markedly increases with decreasing the substances volatility (namely 38, 49, 88, and 94%, for the 
four classes compressed gases, pressure-liquefied gases, volatile liquids and low volatility liquids, 
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respectively). At the same time, a catastrophic rupture is only possible for high-pressure gases or 
pressure liquefied gases (17 and 4%, respectively), while it has been never registered for liquid 
fuels. Also, outcomes characterized by large impact areas, such as VCE and, to a lesser extent, flash 
fire, are likely for gases and PLG (between 7 and 30% probability), but very rare for liquids (5% 
only for high volatility liquids) except for the case of environmental impact. For liquids the most 
dangerous final event is represented by a pool fire, but with an occurrence probability hardly 
exceeding 5%. 
 
 
Regarding causation events, third party activities were found to be the most common cause of 
damage to pipelines, independently of the release severity and for all substance categories, with the 
vast majority of damage caused during excavation activities. This should be properly taken into 
consideration since their occurrence might be significantly reduced by simple procedural 
improvements in work permits and information exchange among the companies involved. The 
second main causes of loss of containment are both mechanical failures and corrosion; in particular, 
corrosion was found to be the main cause of catastrophic rupture for high-pressure gas pipelines. 
Unexpectedly, operational human errors have shown a minor influence on the release frequency, 
ranging between 4 and 13% for the different classes of substances; this might be explained by the 
relatively limited involvement of the human factor on this kind of transportation, compared with 
other transportation modalities, such as road and rail. 
 
 
It is believed that the quantitative results provided in the present paper can be of great help in the 
application of the QRA methodology to the transportation of hazardous materials via pipeline, both 
because of the significant amount of historical data analysed, and also because of their specific 
association with classes of substances instead of being referred to generic hazardous materials as a 
whole. 
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Fig. 1 Methodology of incidents selection. 
Fig. 2 Event tree for compressed gases. 
Fig. 3 Event tree for pressurized liquefied gases. 
Fig. 4 Event tree for volatile liquids. 
Fig. 5 Events tree for liquids with low volatility. 
 
Table 1 Summary of substances for each category identified. 
Substance  Number of entries  % of category 
Compressed gas 
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Substance  Number of entries  % of category 
▓Natural gas 289 99.3 
▓Hydrogen 2  0.7 
Pressurized liquefied gas  
▓LPG 34 68 
▓Anhydrous ammonia 7 14 
▓Ethane 3  6 
▓Ethylene  2  4 
▓Propylene 2  4 
▓Butane 1  2 
▓Carbon monoxide 1  2 
Volatile liquids (with Tf ≤ 21 ̊ C) 
▓Gasoline 303 49.8 
▓Crude oil 287 47.2 
▓Naphtha 7  1.2 
▓Other organic products 11  1.8 
Liquids with low volatility (with Tf >21 ̊ C) 
▓Jet fuel 48 42.1 
▓Diesel 31 27.2 
▓Kerosene 14 12.3 
▓Diesel fuel or heating oil 9  7.9 
▓Fuel oil 9  7.9 
▓Heating oil 2  1.8 
▓Low-sulphur diesel 1  0.9 
 
Table 2 Generic and specific causes of failure. 
Generic cause Specific cause 
Third party activity Vehicles/other equipment not related to 
excavation activity 
 Excavation machinery 
 Heavy loads 
 High-voltage electrical 
 Shipping traffic in river 
Pipe resting on rock 
Corrosion External corrosion 
 Internal corrosion 
 Stress corrosion cracking 
Mechanical failure Aging 
 Construction defects 
 Material defects 
 Overpressure 
 Supports failure 
 Weld failure 
Operational/human error Decommission 
 General operations 
 Hot tapping 
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Generic cause Specific cause 
 Maintenance 
 Pigging operations 
 Pressure testing 
 Repair/replacement 
 Shutdown 
 Start-up 
 Valve operations 
Natural hazard Cold weather 
 Erosion 
 Floods 
 Land slides 
 Heavy rains 
 Lightning 
Equipment failure Buckle in pipe 
 Control system 
 Flange 
 Isolation valves 
 Pumps/compressor 
 Relief valves 
 Rubber gasket 
 Tap connection 
 Thread 
 Valves 
 
 
Table 3 Total probabilities for each type of final event (compressed gases). 
Type of release Final event 
Hole 
(0.364) 
Full bore rupture 
(0.405) 
Catastrophic 
rupture (0.168) 
Unknown 
type (0.062) 
Overall 
probability 
Jet fire 0.357 0.360 0.612 0.462 0.410 
Fireball 0 0 0.612 0 0.111 
Cloud fire (flash fire) 0.061 0.126 0 0 0.074 
Flame front 
acceleration (VCE) 0.510 0.225 0 0.769 0.314 
No consequences 0.367 0.405 0.388 0.231 0.380 
 
Table 4 Distribution of generic and specific causes of failure, according to the type of release of 
compressed gases. 
Type of release 
Hole Full bore rupture Catastrophic rupture Unknown type of release
Generic and specific cause 
No. of entries % of 
release 
category 
No. of 
entries 
% of 
release 
category 
No. of entries % of 
release 
category 
No. of 
entries 
3 2.8 11 9.32 14 28.6 0 
rrosion 1 33.3 5 45.5 8 57.1 - 
Internal corrosion 1 33.3 3 27.3 1  7.1 - 
Stress corrosion cracking 1 33.3 3 27.3 5 35.7 - 
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Type of release 
Hole Full bore rupture Catastrophic rupture Unknown type of release
Generic and specific cause 
No. of entries % of 
release 
category 
No. of 
entries 
% of 
release 
category 
No. of entries % of 
release 
category 
No. of 
entries 
Equipment failure 6 5.7 3 2.5 0 0 0 
1 16.7 - - - - - 
Isolation valves - - 1 33.3 - - - 
Pumps/compressor  1 16.7 - - - - - 
Tap connection - - 1 33.3 - - - 
- - 1 33.3 - - - 
4 66.7 - - - - - 
Mechanical failure 5 4.7 11 9.3 7 14.3 0 
1 20.0 1  9.1 1 14.3 - 
Construction defects - - 1  9.1 1 14.3 - 
Material defects - - - - 1 14.3 - 
Overpressure - - 4 36.4 4 57.1 - 
 2 40.0 5 45.5 - - - 
2 40.0 - - - - - 
Natural hazard 8 7.6 7 5.9 1 2.0 0 
- - 2 28.6 - - - 
6 75.0 3 42.9 1 100.0 - 
1 12.5 1 14.3 - - - 
1 12.5 1 14.3 - - - 
Operational/human error 11 10.4 9 7.6 2 4.1 0 
General operations 1  9.1 - - - - - 
Maintenance 5 45.5 3 33.3 2 100.0 - 
Repair/replacement 3 27.3 4 44.4 - - - 
- - 1 11.1 - - - 
- - 1 11.1 - - - 
ation 1  9.1 - - - - - 
1  9.1 - - - - - 
Third party activity 34 32.1 36 30.5 8 16.3 1 
Vehicle/other equipment not related to 
excavation activity 
4 11.8 7 19.4 1 12.5 - 
Excavation machinery 29 85.3 26 72.2 7 87.5 - 
 - - 2  5.6 - - - 
Shipping traffic in river - - - - - - 1 
1  2.9 1  2.8 - - - 
Unknown cause  39 36.8 41 34.8 17 34.7 17 
Total 106 100.0 118 100.0 49 100.0 18 
 
 
Table 5 Total probabilities for each type of final event (liquefied compressed gases). 
Type of release Final event 
Hole 
(0.531) 
Full bore 
rupture (0.347) 
Catastrophic 
rupture (0.041) 
Unknown 
type (0.082) 
Overall 
probability 
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Jet fire+(Pool fire) 0.273 0.706 1 0 0.465 
Fireball 0 0 1 0 0.047 
Cloud fire 0.182 0.118 0 0 0.140 
Flame front acceleration 0.273 0.412 0 0 0.302 
No ignition 0.455 0.529 0 1 0.488 
 
Table 6 Distribution of generic and specific causes of failure, according to the type of release of 
liquefied compressed gases. 
Type of release 
Hole Full bore rupture Catastrophic rupture
Generic and specific cause  
No. of 
entries 
% of 
release 
category 
No. of 
entries 
% of 
release 
category 
No. of 
entries 
% of 
release 
category 
Corrosion 4 15.4 0 0 0 0 
External corrosion 2 50.0 - - - - 
Internal corrosion 1 25.0 - - - - 
Stress corrosion cracking 1 25.0 - - - - 
Equipment failure 2 7.7 1 5.9 0 0 
Valves 2 100.0 1 100.0 - - 
Mechanical failure 4 15.4 3 17.7 1 50.0 
Construction defects - - - - 1 100.0 
Construction defects and overpressure 1 25.0 - - - - 
Overpressure - - 1 33.3 - - 
Weld failure 2 50.0 2 66.7 - - 
Unknown 1 25.0 - - - - 
Natural hazard 1 3.9 2 11.8 0 0 
Floods 1 100.0 - - - - 
Land slides - - 1 50.0 - - 
Lightning - - 1 50.0 - - 
Operational/human error 1 3.9 2 11.8 0 0 
Maintenance 1 100.0 1 50.0 - - 
Repair/replacement - - 1 50.0 - - 
Third party activity 6 23.1 6 35.3 0 0 
Vehicle/other equipment not related to 
excavation activity 1 16.7 - - - - 
Excavation machinery 4 66.7 6 100.0 - - 
Shipping traffic in river 1 16.7 - - - - 
Unknown cause 8 30.8 3 17.7 1 50.0 
Total 26 100.0 17 100.0 2 100.0 
 
Table 7 Total probabilities for each type of final event (volatile liquids). 
Type of release Final event 
Hole 
(0.753) 
Full bore rupture 
(0.235) 
Unknown type 
(0.012) 
Overall 
probability 
Jet fire 0.011 0.065 0 0.024 
Pool fire 0.051 0.072 0.200 0.057 
▓Local pool fire 0.016 0.022 0.200 0.019 
▓Fire on migrating liquid pool 0.036 0.051 0 0.039 
Page 22 of 24
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Cloud fire 0.033 0.087 0 0.046 
Flame front acceleration 0.062 0.014 0 0.051 
No fire/explosion 0.900 0.826 0.800 0.882 
 
Table 8 Distribution of generic and specific causes of failure, according to the type of release of 
volatile liquids. 
 
Type of release 
Hole Full bore rupture Unknown type of release
Generic and specific cause 
No. of entries % of release category No. of entries % of release category No. of entries 
90 19.7 18 12.6 0 
47 52.2 6 33.3 - 
17 18.9 10 55.6 - 
Stress corrosion cracking 3  3.3 1  5.6 - 
23 25.6 1  5.6 - 
25 5.5 4 2.8 2 
1  4.0 - - - 
- - 1 25.0 - 
10 40.0 1 25.0 - 
2  8.0 2 50.0 - 
1  4.0 - - - 
1  4.0 - - - 
1  4.0 - - - 
4 16.0 - - - 
5 20.0 - - 2 
54 11.8 29 20.3 1 
5  9.3 2  6.9 - 
 7 13.0 2  6.9 - 
11 20.4 4 13.8 1 
Material defects and weld failure 1  1.9 - - - 
- - 4 13.8 - 
Overpressure and aging - - 1  3.5 - 
Overpressure and material defects - - 1  3.5 - 
1  1.9 - - - 
18 33.3 5 17.2 - 
Weld failure and aging 1  1.9 - - - 
Weld failure and overpressure - - 1  3.5 - 
10 18.5 9 31.0 - 
18 3.9 15 10.5 0 
1  5.6 - - - 
5 27.8 4 26.7 - 
1  5.6 - - - 
5 27.8 9 60.0 - 
- - 1  6.7 - 
2 11.1 1  6.7 - 
2 11.1 - - - 
2 11.1 - - - 
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Type of release 
Hole Full bore rupture Unknown type of release
Generic and specific cause 
No. of entries % of release category No. of entries % of release category No. of entries 
Operational/human error 27 5.9 6 4.2 0 
4 14.8 - - - 
1  3.7 1 16.7 - 
1  3.7 - - - 
5 18.5 3 50.0 - 
1  3.7 - - - 
11 40.7 1 16.7 - 
2  7.4 1 16.7 - 
1  3.7 - - - 
1  3.7 - - - 
139 30.4 23 16.1 0 
Vehicle/other equipment not related to excavation activity 22 15.8 6 26.1 - 
Excavation machinery 101 72.7 16 69.6 - 
voltage electrical 1  0.7 - - - 
1  0.7 - - - 
ing traffic in river - - 1  4.4 - 
14 10.1 - - - 
105 22.9 48 33.6 4 
Total 458 100.0 143 100.0 7 
 
 
Table 9 Total probabilities for each type of final event (liquids with low volatility). 
Type of release Final event 
Hole (0.868) Full bore rupture (0.132) 
Overall 
probability 
Jet fire 0.010 0 0.009 
Pool fire 0.041 0.133 0.053 
▓Local pool fire 0.031 0.133 0.044 
▓Fire on migrating liquid surface 0.010 0 0.009 
No fire 0.949 0.867 0.938 
 
Table 10 Distribution of generic and specific causes, according to types of release (liquids with low 
volatility). 
Type of release 
Hole Full bore rupture 
Generic and specific cause 
No. of entries  % of release category No. of entries % of release category
Corrosion 17 17.2 2 13.3 
External corrosion 6 35.3 1 50.0 
Internal corrosion 3 17.7 - - 
Stress corrosion cracking 2 11.8 - - 
Unknown 6 35.3 1 50.0 
Equipment failure 8 8.1 1 6.7 
Flange 5 62.5 1 100.0 
Pumps/compressor  1 12.5 - - 
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Type of release 
Hole Full bore rupture 
Generic and specific cause 
No. of entries  % of release category No. of entries % of release category
Valves 2 25.0 - - 
Mechanical failure 24 24.2 5 33.3 
Aging 2  8.3 - - 
Construction defects 1  4.2 1 20.0 
Construction defects and weld failure 1  4.2 - - 
Material defects 7 29.2 - - 
Overpressure 1  4.2 3 60.0 
Weld failure 10 41.7 1 20.0 
Unknown 2  8.3 - - 
Natural hazard 0 0 1 6.7 
Low temperatures - - 1 100.0 
Operational/human error 5 5.1 2 13.3 
General operations 1 20.0 - - 
Maintenance 2 40.0 1 50.0 
Pressure testing 1 20.0 - - 
Start-up 1 20.0 - - 
Valve operation - - 1 50.0 
Third party activity 33 33.3 0 0 
Vehicle/other equipment not related to excavation activity 3  9.1 - - 
Excavation machinery 29 87.9 - - 
Unknown 1  3.0 - - 
Unknown cause 12 12.1 4 26.7 
Total 99 100.0 15 100.0 
 
 
 
